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Abstract: There have recently been a series of prominent projects in the UK that aim to bring 
philosophy into the heart of prison education. The aim of this paper is to consider a possible 
rationale for this pedagogical development. A distinction is drawn between a content and a 
sensibility approach to teaching philosophy, where the latter is primarily concerned not with 
teaching a particular subject matter but rather with developing a certain kind of critical ex-
pertise. It is argued that the sensibility conception of teaching philosophy dovetails with an 
influential account of the epistemic aim of education in terms of the cultivation of intellectual 
character, in the specific sense of developing the intellectual virtues that constitute one’s intel-
lectual character (i.e., virtuous intellectual character). The significance of this point for prison 
education is illustrated by considering how the use of a pedagogical approach in prison edu-
cation known as CoPI (‘Community of Philosophical Inquiry’) can be construed as teaching 
philosophy on the sensibility model just outlined. With this in mind, it is argued that the value 
of teaching philosophy in prisons primarily relates to how it provides a particularly funda-
mental kind of education, one that is both finally and instrumentally valuable. These points are 
illustrated throughout by considering a particular case study involving a recent philosophy in 
prisons project that employed the CoPI methodology. 
Keywords: prison education, philosophy of education, community of philosophical inquiry, 
virtue epistemology, philosophy in prisons, epistemology
Why Teach Philosophy in Prison
In recent years there has been a renewed interest in the UK in the idea of teaching 
philosophy in prisons, with numerous initiatives being launched for just this purpose.1 One 
challenge facing any such project is to explain why philosophy, specifically, should be taught 
in this context. In particular, wouldn’t it be more beneficial for prisoners to be taught expertise 
of a more practical nature, such as accountancy or electrical engineering? This issue dovetails 
with a further question, which is what we take ourselves to be doing when we teach philosophy 
in prisons (which may or may not be different from what we take ourselves to be doing when 
we teach philosophy more generally). The reason why the two questions inter-relate is that one 
can view the teaching of philosophy as itself offering a kind of practical expertise, albeit of 
1 Some recent examples: the University of Aberdeen ran a project (2012-13) bringing philosophy into a local 
prison (HMP Aberdeen); Kirstine Szifris has run philosophy in prisons projects (2014-17) at HMP Grendon, 
HMP Full Sutton, and HMP Thorn Cross; and since 2016 KCL has been running a philosophy in prisons project 
at HMP Belmarsh, a project that has led to the creation of the nationwide Philosophy in Prison charity (see 
www.philosophyinprison.com). There is also the philosophy in prisons project that has been run by the Uni-
versity of Edinburgh since 2014, which is described in more detail below. See Szifris (2016; 2018) for further 
discussion of the philosophy in prison projects that she ran.
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a very general nature (which is not to say that it is thereby of less practical utility than more 
specialized forms of expertise; indeed, it may have greater practical utility). 
In particular, we can differentiate in this regard between two different ways in which 
one might teach philosophy. One might approach the teaching of philosophy by focusing on 
imparting the subject matter of philosophy—i.e., philosophical ideas and theses, and the histo-
ry of the discipline. In this content approach to teaching the subject, teaching philosophy isn’t 
essentially any different from teaching any other subject matter, such as civil engineering or 
organic chemistry. There is an alternative conception of teaching philosophy, however, where-
by one’s overarching goal is not imparting a body of knowledge at all, but rather cultivating a 
kind of critical sensibility that is characteristic of a philosophical engagement with a topic. Call 
this the sensibility approach. 
In practice, of course, this distinction does not manifest itself in a clear-cut fashion, 
not least because often one is aiming, to varying degrees, to achieve both aims—i.e., to impart 
knowledge of the subject matter of philosophy and develop the kind of expertise that is asso-
ciated with good philosophical inquiry. Nonetheless, the distinction is useful to bear in mind, 
since the two approaches can come completely apart. In particular, in line with the content 
approach, one could potentially teach the subject matter of philosophy without thereby culti-
vating any kind of critical philosophical sensibility at all. Conversely, in line with the sensitiv-
ity approach, one could in principle cultivate a critical philosophical sensibility without in the 
process imparting any knowledge of the subject matter of philosophy. 
This distinction between a content and a sensibility conception of teaching philosophy 
is especially important when it comes to prison education since the particular initiatives that 
bring philosophy into prison education that are of concern to us are of the latter kind, with a 
focus on developing a kind of philosophical expertise rather than teaching the subject matter of 
philosophy. Indeed, they are often especially pure manifestations of the sensibility conception 
of teaching philosophy, in that philosophical subject matter barely enters into the proceedings. 
For example, a number of philosophy in prison education initiatives employ approaches to 
teaching philosophy like Community of Philosophical Inquiry (CoPI)—which we will consid-
er in more detail in a moment—that are predominantly focused on developing a kind of phil-
osophical expertise. Whether that makes the teaching of philosophy in prison more palatable 
(compared to the pedagogical alternatives) depends, of course, on whether we think such an 
expertise has value for the prisoners concerned. 
I want to confront this issue by situating contemporary philosophy-based prison educa-
tion initiatives in terms of a wider project that offers a virtue-theoretic conception of the goals 
of education. I suggest that this way of teaching philosophy is concerned with the cultivation 
of intellectual character, which is the subject’s stable set of integrated cognitive skills. In par-
ticular, I claim that this style of teaching philosophy in prisons cultivates intellectual character 
in the specific sense of developing a sub-class of the subject’s cognitive skills known as the 
intellectual virtues—i.e., it is devoted to developing virtuous intellectual character. I will be 
saying more about the intellectual virtues in due course, but one key point I will be making in 
this regard is that developing a subject’s intellectual virtues involves more than just developing 
their critical thinking capacities (though the two kinds of cognitive trait are closely related, 
as we will see). The wider conclusion that I will be arguing for is that on a virtue-theoretic 
conception of education, according to which education is geared towards the cultivation of 
virtuous intellectual character, it makes perfect sense to teach prisoners philosophy in the ways 
described. Indeed, while everyone would benefit from being taught philosophy on this model, 
there are reasons to think that it might be especially advantageous to prisoners. 
A CoPI-Based Philosophy in Prisons Project
It will be useful for our purposes to consider a concrete philosophy-based prison 
education initiative. This was a collaboration between faculty from the University of Edin-
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burgh—specifically philosophers from the Eidyn research centre which is based in the School 
of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, and faculty from the Moray House School 
of Education—and colleagues at the ‘chalk-face’ of prison education who at that time were 
working in this sector as part of a contract between New College Lanarkshire and the Scottish 
Prison Service. While the project has since been expanded to other prisons, in its initial phase 
(which will be our focus here) it was targeted on just two Scottish prisons, HMP Low Moss and 
HMP Cornton Vale, which house male and female prisoners, respectively. The project has been 
described in detail elsewhere (Pritchard, 2019), so here I will focus on those elements that are 
most relevant to our current concerns.
The teaching was centred around a weekly classroom discussion, with classes of around 
7-8 students. This class size was chosen because it was large enough to create a lively discus-
sion group, but also small enough to allow for full participation in the planned discussions. 
Each run of the course lasted for seven weeks. Each week the students were shown a video 
which covered a core area of philosophy. These videos were created from a highly successful 
MOOC (Massive Open Online Course) entitled ‘Introduction to Philosophy’ that the Eidyn 
research centre has been running since 2013 on the Coursera platform. This is designed to offer 
an accessible introduction to the main areas of philosophy and presupposes no background 
knowledge in the subject. The MOOC has been very popular, with millions of people taking the 
course worldwide. Since prisoners do not have access to the internet, it was necessary to spe-
cially create an off-line version of the lectures from this course. Each video covers a core area 
of philosophy, starting with topics that students are likely to have some familiarity with (such 
as ethics and political philosophy) before moving on to more abstract topics like epistemology 
(e.g., scepticism) and metaphysics (e.g., free will).
Each weekly discussion seminar was paired with a topic from the video that the stu-
dents watched that week. These discussion seminars employed the CoPI methodology. This is a 
pedagogical approach to developing thinking and reasoning skills that is familiar from Philos-
ophy for Children (P4C) programmes (Kennedy, 2012; Lipman, 1998).2 While CoPI is widely 
used in philosophy education projects aimed at children, it has also been found to be effective 
as a way of teaching philosophy at any educational level, particularly when the students con-
cerned are encountering philosophy for the first time. The aim of the CoPI methodology is to 
create open, discursive environments that break the process of thinking down into its essential 
characteristics in order to make rational processes, ordinarily implicit, explicit to the protago-
nists, and thereby help students to develop critical judgement. CoPI-based discussions foster 
collaborative inquiries among the participants, encourage the clear articulation of ideas, and 
provide a structured opportunity for self-expression. This discursive environment is facilitated 
by the discussion leader creating an intellectual setting that puts the focus on reasons and rea-
soning. This is achieved via the implementation of ‘rules of play’, rather than aiming to cover 
specific kinds of philosophical content (though that may be covered as a means of stimulating 
discussion). CoPI is thus straightforwardly aligned with the sensibility, rather than the content, 
conception of teaching philosophy noted above.3
For an example of these rules of play, students were not allowed to use their real name, 
but were required to create a fake name for the purpose of the discussion. This helped stu-
dents to abstract away from their personal experience and focus on the reasons at issue. This 
is particularly important in a prison context, as the prison educators we worked with pointed 
out that it is difficult to prevent discussions from becoming forums for the students to discuss 
their lives (even when this is explicitly not the purpose of the discussion), and in particular 
2 The version of CoPI that we employed was highly influenced by McCall (2009). See also Szifris (2016) for 
discussion of a philosophy in prisons project based around the CoPI methodology that was based at HMP Gren-
don.
3 CoPI is thus a form of ‘non-directive’ teaching’ in the sense articulated by Hand (2018, 37), such that the dia-
logues introduced and facilitated by the discussion leader have no particular persuasive aim. Teaching philoso-
phy in the content sense, in contrast, would constitute ‘directive’ teaching. 
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the circumstances that led to them being in prison.4 Another key rule of play is that in order to 
enter a claim—make a move in this game of reasons, as it were—students had to make explicit 
their reasons for making their assertion, so that the reasoning itself can be brought forth for dis-
cussion by the group. Relatedly, in objecting to an assertion a student must be willing to state 
both the claim that is being objected to and also the reason offered for that claim. In this way 
the students become used to the idea both of explicitly formulating their reasons and of under-
standing the explicit formulation of reasons offered by others. Rules of play of this kind enable 
the educator, whose goal is merely to facilitate this discussion (rather than direct it, much less 
‘teach’ the students), to focus the discussion on reasons, and thereby on what it is to engage in 
good reasoning. The discursive nature of the process means that the students learn together, in 
a social and collaborative environment that is receptive to each person’s contribution.
CoPI provides an ideal structure to discuss ideas in a philosophical manner, as the focus 
is not on a specific philosophical subject matter, much is it less designed to test student knowl-
edge of that subject matter, but is rather concerned with developing ways of thinking critically. 
The CoPI pedagogical approach also has obvious advantages in a prison context, where one 
cannot assume anything about the academic background of the students, given the wide range 
of educational backgrounds of the prisoners.5 Moreover, as we’ve already noted, the strictly 
impersonal nature of this approach, whereby personal digressions are disallowed, is also useful 
in a prison setting, as it helps the students to avoid distractions and focus on the ideas in play. 
The results of this project have been discussed at length elsewhere (Pritchard, 2019), 
but we can summarize the four main themes that are of particular relevance for our present 
purposes as follows. First, there was clear evidence of the students developing their critical 
reasoning capacities, such as the ability to articulate reasoning in support of their claims, to 
accurately represent the reasoning offered by others, and to articulate competing considerations 
in support of a claim (and thereby adjudicate between different positions in a debate). As one 
of the prison educators interviewed put it when asked what the prisoners gained from doing the 
CoPI seminars: 
Critical thinking skills. They are developed in a lot of other subjects up to a 
point, but that’s the biggest transformation I’ve seen in the nearly five years 
that I’ve worked with prisoners in such a short space of time. […] I think their 
critical thinking and their way of listening and interacting with each other 
and actually how they articulate themselves changed dramatically. (Quoted in 
Pritchard, 2019, p. 256)
Second, students also developed related cognitive skills, such as a sensitivity to evi-
dence and reasons, an ability to fairly examine ideas that are not their own, a willingness to 
change their mind in the face of argument, and a greater tendency to reflect on their beliefs 
where appropriate. Indeed, this was a recurring theme in the prisoners’ own descriptions of 
what they gained from the CoPI seminars. Here is one of the prisoners describing the effect of 
CoPI in this regard:
I think this course gives you more understanding, you learn how to manage 
things better, you learn how to look at things from all different points of view. 
Whereas before you would just look at it from your own point of view, which 
4 There are also obviously both practical and ethical reasons in a prison education context why it might be im-
portant to preserve the student’s anonymity.
5 A recent longitudinal study of prisoners in England and Wales—see Williams, Papadopoulou & Booth 
(2012)—makes startling reading in this regard (and in several other regards too). For example, it reports that an 
astonishing 63% of prisoners had been suspended or temporarily excluded from school, with 42% experiencing 
permanent exclusion. (For comparison, a recent report for the UK government—see Timpson (2019, 6)—notes 
that just 0.06% of schoolchildren nationwide were permanently excluded in the 2013/14 school year). A recent 
report on Scottish prisons specifically states that around 20% of prisoners had difficulties with writing, numbers, 
and reading (against a national average of around 3%). (Scottish Government Justice Directorate Report 2015, 
6)
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is quite selfish, you know. But, now you’re open to other ideas, so it makes 
your mind open to new issues that you wouldn’t think about so much. (Quoted 
in Pritchard, 2019, p. 257) 
Third, students demonstrated greater intellectual respect for others, such as a willing-
ness to carefully listen to what others are saying and then rationally engage with them. Several 
prisoners reported that the CoPI seminars gave them an insight into how they had previously 
been insufficiently attentive to what others were saying, but that engaging with the CoPI meth-
od helped them to change in this regard. For example: 
I actually needed to learn how to listen and absorb information, also how to 
construct arguments properly and not just jump in and try and talk over peo-
ple. This is a major issue of mine. It always has been. (Quoted in Pritchard, 
2019, p. 258)
Finally, fourth, students displayed a greater degree of intellectual self-respect, in the 
sense that they put greater stock in their own opinions and in their cognitive capacities. In-
terestingly, this was especially so with regard to the female prisoners, who in general were 
described (by both themselves and by the teachers involved) as suffering from low self-esteem 
(both intellectually and otherwise). Here is how one female prisoner from HMP Cornton Vale 
described the results of taking this CoPI-based course:
[T]his course has actually given me a lot of confidence. To feel like your ac-
tual opinion does count and it’s okay to give your opinion, no matter whether 
you agree with other people or not. (Quoted in Pritchard, 2019, p. 258)
These four themes are all closely related, of course. For example, in developing critical 
thinking skills, it is unsurprising that one also enhances one’s cognitive skills more generally, 
or that one demonstrates a greater intellectual respect for others. Nonetheless, it is important 
to keep these themes distinct, since as we will see there are ways in which the development of 
one aspect of a student’s cognitive abilities might be achieved in isolation from the others. It is 
also notable that the students themselves recognized the value of the kinds of cognitive traits 
developed by CoPI, both in terms of how they are useful across a wide range of situations and 
in terms of how they are important to their own personal development. On the latter front, for 
example, here is one of the prisoners describing the cognitive skills they gained from partici-
pating in the CoPI tutorials:
[…] the skills are not just useful in a CoPI [tutorial], these are skills that are 
useful when you’re back in the block, when you’re dealing with officers, 
when you’re having to go to ICMs [integrated case management meetings 
…]. They’re skills that are transferable to everything […]. I’ve actually found 
myself watching more news and things that are of interest and topics that are 
quite current, so you can do these sorts of things, maybe secretly practising it 
and no telling other people you’re practicing on them, you know what I mean? 
(Quoted in Pritchard, 2019, p. 257) 
Education as the Cultivation of Intellectual Character
The CoPI methodology dovetails with a conception of the epistemic goals of education 
that has proved popular, both historically and in the contemporary literature. According to this 
proposal, the overarching goal of education, at least from a purely epistemic point of view, is 
the cultivation of intellectual character. As already noted, intellectual character here concerns 
the subject’s stable and integrated set of cognitive skills. This includes both innate cognitive 
faculties, like one’s perceptual or memorial skills, and also acquired cognitive capacities, such 
as arithmetical or observational skills that one has learnt through training. 
When theorists describe the epistemic goal of education as being the cultivation of 
intellectual character, however, they are usually understanding intellectual character in a par-
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ticular way, such that it specifically concerns the development of an especially sophisticated 
sub-set of the subject’s stable and integrated cognitive skills known as the intellectual virtues. 
That is, the overarching epistemic goal of education on this proposal is not so much the devel-
opment of intellectual character simpliciter (which may not involve any specific development 
of the intellectual virtues), but rather virtuous intellectual character (which does essentially 
concern the development of the intellectual virtues). The intellectual virtues are admirable 
character traits like curiosity, intellectual humility, integrity, intellectual tenacity, conscien-
tiousness, and intellectual courage (Battaly, 2014; Roberts & Wood, 2007; Zagzebski, 1996). 
These are acquired cognitive skills that involve a nuanced capacity for judgement across a 
broad range of application and which are accompanied by distinctive motivations (as we will 
see in a moment). As such, the intellectual virtues are clearly instrumentally valuable due to 
their practical utility. But they are also held to be of final (non-instrumental) value too, on ac-
count of how they enable one to flourish as a human being. Accordingly, while education might 
in addition serve all kinds of non-epistemic purposes, such as practical, ethical, or political 
aims, its epistemic goals are thought to be geared towards the development of a virtuous in-
tellectual character on account of the special value (both practical and final) of the intellectual 
virtues (Baehr, 2016; Battaly, 2006; Byerly, 2019; Hyslop-Margison, 2003; MacAllister, 2012; 
Pritchard, 2013; 2015; 2018; 2020; Sockett, 2012; Watson, 2018).6 
We can see the attraction of such a proposal by considering the alternatives. For exam-
ple, perhaps the epistemic goal of education should be a particular kind of epistemic standing, 
such as having true beliefs or knowledge. One of the problems facing this kind of view, how-
ever, is that it seems to imply that many of our educational practices are somewhat redundant, 
at least from a purely epistemic perspective. If this is the epistemic goal of education, then why 
encourage students to think for themselves, or to be able to undertake their own inquiries? Why 
not instead simply drill them with the true beliefs or knowledge that you want them to have, 
and make sure that they passively accept what they are taught?7 The point is that education is 
not primarily about what one learns, but rather how one learns, and that means that what we 
are trying to cultivate through education is the good intellectual character to acquire epistemic 
goods like true belief or knowledge in the right kind of way. 
The CoPI method speaks directly to a characterization of the epistemic goal of educa-
tion as the development of intellectual character because of its focus on thinking itself, and in 
particular how to think (and reason, and argue, etc.) well. The setting aside of the goal of learn-
ing facts about a subject matter—and anything else that is extraneous to the task in hand—is 
important to bringing the nature of thinking itself to the fore. So understood, CoPI is a way 
of teaching philosophy that is aligned with the sensibility conception that was outlined above, 
such that one is engaged in the philosophical practice of thinking about thinking as opposed to 
learning particular philosophical theses or arguments (though one might learn the latter while 
in pursuit of the former). While there are undoubtedly other ways of cultivating intellectual 
character, and thereby targeting the epistemic goal of education, pursuing philosophy on the 
sensibility conception as CoPI does is a particularly direct way of doing so.8
Thus far we have made a case for thinking that the epistemic goal of education is the de-
6 See also the wider literature on the role of the virtues in education, beyond the intellectual virtues specifical-
ly, such as Carr (2014) and Kristjánsson (2015). For further discussion of the epistemology of education more 
generally, see Robertson (2009) and Baehr (2016).
7 This point becomes even more acute once one considers the increasing reliance on technology in education, as 
explained in Pritchard (2018).
8 Another way that virtuous intellectual character (and, indeed, virtuous character in general) is often held to be 
cultivated is through the emulation of virtuous exemplars. For some recent discussions of virtuous exemplars in 
education, see Zagzebski (2010; 2017), Olberding (2012), Tanesini (2016), Croce & Vaccarezza (2017), Kors-
gaard (2019), Alfano & Sullivan (2019), Croce (2019; 2020), and Croce & Pritchard (forthcoming). The role of 
exemplars in prison education brings with it further issues—such as how prisoners relate to perceived authority 
figures and the importance of exemplars who are sufficiently relatable to the students concerned—that would 
take us too far afield to explore here (though I hope to be able to do so in future work).
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velopment of intellectual character, and that teaching philosophy on the sensibility conception 
via the CoPI methodology is an especially straightforward way of pursuing this goal. Interest-
ingly, however, while it is plausible that CoPI is devoted to the cultivation of intellectual char-
acter, it isn’t obvious that it is concerned with the cultivation of virtuous intellectual character 
specifically (i.e., with the development of the intellectual virtues). 
This point is particularly pressing for our purposes since the CoPI method is often ex-
plicitly characterized as being geared towards critical thinking, and while the skills involved 
in critical thinking often overlap with the intellectual virtues, they are not necessarily the same 
thing. The reason for this is that there is more to the intellectual virtues than just the cognitive 
capacities involved in critical thinking. There are various features of the intellectual virtues 
that are relevant in this regard, but one key feature is that the intellectual virtues have a dis-
tinctive motivational component that need not be associated with critical thinking capacities. 
In particular, to be intellectually virtuous is to be motivated towards intellectually good ends, 
which means to have an overarching desire for the truth and thus for accuracy. This is a more 
demanding requirement than is relevant for most other cognitive skills, including critical think-
ing skills, as usually the possession of a cognitive skill doesn’t require that the subject has this 
specific motivation (which is why the intellectual virtues are a distinctive kind of cognitive 
skill). In particular, cognitive skills, like skills more generally, can usually be successfully 
manifested with purely strategic motives, or indeed with no motives at all. In the case of critical 
thinking skills, for example, one might successfully employ them simply because one wishes to 
win an argument, or to look clever in front of one’s peers. The same is not true of the intellec-
tual virtues, however. One might successfully act as if one is intellectually humble for purely 
strategic reasons, for example—perhaps because one thinks that others will be impressed as a 
result—but while what one is doing is undoubtedly skillful (it is hard to even appear intellectu-
ally humble after all), it is not the manifestation of intellectual humility, since that intellectual 
virtue is always accompanied with the appropriate motivational state. 
There is a lively debate in the literature about whether thinking of the epistemic goals of 
education as being devoted to the cultivation of intellectual character should be cashed-out in 
terms of the development of the intellectual virtues or merely in terms of certain critical think-
ing capacities (Baehr, 2019; Carter, Kotzee & Siegel, 2019; Hitchcock, 2018; Huber & Kun-
cel, 2016; Hyslop-Margison, 2003; Siegel, 1988, 1997, 2017). I think it is clear that the CoPI 
methodology is primarily focused on the development of intellectual character in general, and 
that it at least develops intellectual character in the weak sense of enhancing students’ critical 
thinking capacities. But I want to suggest that what it actually does in practice is cultivate in-
tellectual character in the strong sense of developing the intellectual virtues (and thus virtuous 
intellectual character). 
Indeed, we can see this in the results of the case study noted above. The student prison-
ers who attended the CoPI seminars weren’t learning merely to employ critical thinking skills 
but were in addition acquiring the motivations that accompany the intellectual virtues. Being 
willing to change one’s mind in the face of the counter-evidence, or showing greater intellec-
tual self-respect or respect for others, are cognitive traits that encompass more than just critical 
thinking capacities. This is because they essentially involve having an overarching desire for 
the truth that is associated with the intellectual virtues. 
Moreover, it is not a mere side-effect of the CoPI methodology that it has this result. 
One could certainly teach critical thinking in a purely instrumental fashion, whereby one focus-
es on certain practical goods, like winning arguments or impressing one’s peers, and showing 
how reasoning in this manner might achieve those goals. But CoPI is precisely not instrumental 
in this way. It is rather focused on the nature of thinking itself, with all other concerns, includ-
ing the practical utility of good reasoning, set to one side. It is this feature of the methodology 
that makes students aware of how the space of reasons functions independently of any practical 
merit this learning might generate, and in the process helps to develop in the students a delight 
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in reasoning itself, and thus in the truth, which is what reasoning aims for. The CoPI method is 
thus a way of bringing the epistemic goal of education right to the very fore of the educational 
enterprise. When viewed this way, it is no surprise that the employment of this method leads to 
the development of the intellectual virtues, and thus cultivates virtuous intellectual character. 
Cultivating Virtuous Intellectual Character in a Prison Setting
With the foregoing in mind, let us return to our question of what purpose teaching phi-
losophy in prisons serves. If by ‘philosophy’ here one means teaching prisoners about a body 
of philosophical knowledge—philosophical theories, arguments, the history of the subject, and 
so on—then nothing we’ve argued for here would show that there is any specific benefit to 
teaching that in prisons, as opposed to teaching history, say, or poetry. Any number of topics 
can be worth learning, with philosophy just one of many. Indeed, if the goal is just to train the 
prisoners up in a particular subject matter, then it might well make sense to focus on subjects 
that have more practical appeal, such as accountancy or electrical engineering. 
It is not this content sense of teaching philosophy that is held to be of specific inter-
est to prison education, however, but rather the sensibility conception of teaching philosophy 
that was articulated above, whereby one trains students to think about the nature of thinking 
itself. As we have seen, this is just what the CoPI method is all about. Moreover, we have also 
argued that this method helps to cultivate intellectual character in the strong sense of develop-
ing the intellectual virtues (i.e., and not just critical thinking capacities). In addition, we have 
contended that the development of intellectual character in just this manner is the overarching 
epistemic goal of education. By employing the CoPI method one is thus targeting that goal is a 
particularly straightforward fashion. 
The foregoing only demonstrates the general utility of teaching the CoPI method, how-
ever, and not specifically the utility of employing it within prison education. Still, one might 
argue that conceiving of the teaching of philosophy in this fashion at least explains why philos-
ophy in this sense might have a special role to play in prison education, in that it has a special 
role to play in any educational context. That said, I still think we can provide a further rationale 
for why teaching philosophy, via the employment of the CoPI method, might be especially 
relevant to prison education.
We’ve already noted one such consideration above, which is that CoPI doesn’t presup-
pose anything about the students’ academic background; indeed, it doesn’t even presuppose 
that the students can read and write. This is very important in the context of prison education, 
where there are students with a diverse range of educational backgrounds, including a high 
number of students who have a very limited experience of formal education.9 
A further practical benefit of employing the CoPI method relates to the utility of the 
skills that it generates. While the intellectual virtues are held to be finally valuable, they are also 
practically useful skills to have as well (as are, for that matter, mere critical thinking skills). 
Indeed, they are by their nature highly transferable skills, which are useful to dealing with a 
wide range of challenges (whether intellectual, social, practical, and so on). In particular, pos-
sessing the intellectual virtues will help prisoners to acquire further expertise of a specifically 
practical nature, since the intellectual virtues help one to learn.10 Indeed, that CoPI generates 
such practically useful skills was also a theme in the results of the case study described above. 
This highlights the point that it is misleading to contrast the teaching of philosophy in this con-
tent sense to prisoners with teaching them practical skills, as if this is a zero-sum choice. We 
should rather view the teaching of philosophy as a way of enhancing the overall educational 
9 See endnote 5 for further details about the educational background of prisoners in the UK.
10 There’s a useful summary of the practical benefits of teaching for the intellectual virtues in Baehr (2015). 
See also Baehr (2021). For a helpful recent discussion of the extrinsic merits of teaching philosophy via the 
CoPI method specifically (i.e., teaching philosophy on the sensibility conception, as we have put it), see Gatley 
(2020). See also Trickey & Topping (2004), McCall (2009), and Gorard, Siddiqui & See (2017).
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opportunities for prisoners. Relatedly, insofar as one holds that the teaching of practical skills 
to prisoners is vitally important for improving recidivism rates, then that needn’t count against 
the teaching of philosophy in prisons.
Beyond these practical advantages to teaching philosophy in prisons, there are other 
advantages whose value is not predominately instrumental. We’ve noted above that the virtues, 
and hence the intellectual virtues, are held to be finally (i.e., non-instrumentally) valuable in 
that they contribute to a life of flourishing. Clearly to be able to flourish as a person is valuable 
to anyone, but there might be specific reasons why we would want prisoners to flourish in this 
way. There was evidence of this in the case study noted above, where the cultivation of intel-
lectually virtuous character was found by the prisoners to be empowering. This is obviously 
important for prisoners who often feel powerless, particularly from an intellectual point of 
view, in the sense that their opinions are not valued or listened to.11
More generally, cultivating virtuous intellectual character helps one to both value one-
self and also others, and this is also important in the context of prison education. In particular, 
it helps prisoners to handle social situations involving debate without this collapsing into hos-
tility or conflict. This advantage was seen in the results from the case study, where the prisoners 
who completed the course displayed both an intellectual self-respect and an intellectual respect 
for others. Indeed, some of the prisoners themselves remarked on how this had changed their 
dealings with others, to the extent that they attributed their previous difficulties to a failure 
to properly communicate with others, which they saw rooted in their own inability to reason 
clearly or understand the reasoning employed by others.12 Here, for example, is testimony from 
one of the prisoners:
I think a lot of the trouble I’ve been involved in in the past, especially vio-
lence, has been through misunderstanding, or being misunderstood has led to 
a lot of the violence including what I’m in for now […] In CoPI, it’s good to 
hear people having different views, without actually feeling as if, well actual-
ly different from me, just because they believe or they have a different view 
on something, it doesn’t mean they disagree with what my views are. A lot of 
stuff and violence that I’ve been involved in in the past has been through mis-
understanding, you know […]. (Quoted in Pritchard, 2019, p. 257)
Clearly such skills, while finally valuable, are also practically useful as well. In particular, if 
prisoners are to prosper outside of prison, then it is vital that they not only gain the practical 
skills that will ensure gainful employment, but also the social skills that enable them to proper-
ly relate to others. But that in turn requires the development of the relevant kinds of cognitive 
skills, and that is something that the cultivation of virtuous intellectual character speaks direct-
ly to.
Concluding Remarks
The foregoing offers an overarching rationale for the teaching of philosophy in prisons, 
11 We’ve previously noted that this issue of empowerment was particularly evident in the case of the women’s 
prison that was part of the study described above. Powerlessness among prisoners, and how this affects their 
health, especially their mental health, has been widely explored in the empirical literature. For a recent study in 
a UK prison that looks at health outcomes in prisoners, including issues regarding mental health that are relevant 
to our current concerns, see De Viggiani (2007). For a recent discussion of the specific issue of powerlessness 
among prisoners, and the role of prison education in mitigating this, see Evans, Pelletier & Szkola (2018). See 
also Duguid (1988). The issue of powerlessness among prisoners is also related to a range of other issues, not 
least the way in which prison demands that prisoners adopt different identities in order to accommodate the pris-
on regime. See, for example, Crewe et al (2014), Liebling & Williams (2018), and Warr (2019). (I am grateful to 
Kirstine Szifris for alerting me to relevant literature on this last topic).
12 Note that it is not being suggested that employing teaching philosophy in prisons via the CoPI method is the 
only way achieving this. For example, therapy could be used for a similar purpose. For example, Szifris (2016) 
argues that the CoPI method should be employed in prisons alongside therapy, where each is contributing to the 
success of the other (without being in competition with each other, due to the very different foci of philosophical 
and therapeutic dialogue). 
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at least where this is construed in terms of the sensibility conception that involves the devel-
opment of a distinctive kind of philosophical critical expertise. There is a sense in which phil-
osophical training in this fashion—such as embodied in the CoPI pedagogical method found 
in some of the UK-based philosophy in prisons projects under consideration—is really just 
teaching in the broadest possible manner, in that it is directly targeted at the cultivation of the 
subject’s intellectual character, in the specific sense of their virtuous intellectual character. 
This is in keeping with a particular conception of the fundamental epistemic goal of education, 
whereby the cultivation of virtuous intellectual character generates goods for the subject that 
are not only instrumentally but also finally valuable, in that it helps them to flourish as persons. 
Moreover, we have argued that there are benefits, both instrumental and final, to teaching that 
enhances virtuous intellectual character in a specifically prison setting.13
13 I’m grateful to Kirstine Szifris and two anonymous referees for this journal who offered detailed comments 
on an earlier version of this paper. Thanks also to Mary Bovill, Kristina Lee, Aislinn O’Donnell, and Mike 
Coxhead.
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